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THE CONTENT
OF CONFRONTATION
LISA KERN GRIFFIN*
ABSTRACT
This piece comments on the state of the Supreme Court’s
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence at the close of the October 2010
Term. The 2004 Crawford v. Washington decision established that
criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to cross examine
witnesses whose testimonial out-of-court statements are introduced into
evidence. The seemingly categorical quality of that precedent is called
into question by the Court’s reasoning in Michigan v. Bryant. The
Court appears to have come full circle since Crawford: Bryant suggests
that an out-of-court statement is admissible even absent confrontation
if a multi-factor balancing test verifies its reliability. That inquiry
closely resembles the Ohio v. Roberts framework that Crawford
purportedly overruled, and the Bryant decision leaves lower courts with
an open-textured analysis once again. The Court has all but held that
the Confrontation Clause applies if an out-of-court statement provides
the sort of evidence that implicates the Confrontation Clause. One way
out of that loop might be to look more closely at the content of the right
to confrontation, which the Court equates with cross examination.
Focusing on the undertheorized role of cross examination itself—
including the extent to which it has any potential to ensure reliability—
could clarify when the right applies and address open questions about
what confrontation requires as well.

* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. My thanks to Alexandra Costanza and
Joanna Darcus for excellent research assistance, and to the members of the Duke Journal of
Constitutional Law & Public Policy for their editorial contributions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions on the Confrontation
Clause focus on the admissibility of out-of-court statements, or
hearsay declarations, that inculpate criminal defendants. In order to
satisfy the right to confrontation, the Court has concluded that
witnesses who make “testimonial” hearsay statements must be subject
1
to cross examination. The 2004 Crawford v. Washington decision
purportedly introduced this categorical approach, but it has proven
difficult to determine which statements meet the definition of
“testimonial” and thus require confrontation. The shift from a
construction of the confrontation right grounded in substantive
reliability concerns to a focus on its procedural guarantees at first
appeared marked. Yet with each iteration of Crawford’s meaning, the
essential claims in different opinions sound increasingly similar.
Despite surface distinctions, the decisions reveal underlying
agreement about the epistemic aspirations of confrontation and about
the sole means to achieve them: cross examination. Accordingly, as
one approach to the remaining questions about the definition of
testimonial, the Court might consider the potential utility of cross
examination. Attention to the undertheorized question of what cross
examination actually accomplishes at trial could also ensure that the
right to confrontation has some force when it applies.
II. “WITNESSES AGAINST”
The Sixth Amendment provides that “in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
2
witnesses against him.” Although the rules of evidence exclude many
statements made by out-of-court declarants, they also provide for
numerous exceptions to that rule, grounded in the necessity or
3
reliability of hearsay evidence. Read literally, the Confrontation
Clause would preclude any hearsay declarants from serving as
“witnesses against” a criminal defendant, absent confrontation. The
Confrontation Clause does not, however, impose an absolute bar to
hearsay, and the Court has long recognized that some hearsay is
4
admissible against criminal defendants.

1.
2.
3.
4.

541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See FED. R. EVID. 801–04.
See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980).

GRIFFIN 11.30.11 V.2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

11/30/2011 12:32 PM

THE CONTENT OF CONFRONTATION

53

A. Overlap between the Hearsay Prohibition and the Confrontation
Right
A central conflict in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence is
whether the same accuracy concerns that animate the hearsay
prohibition and its exceptions also provide the rationale for the
Confrontation Clause, and thus help determine when the
constitutional protection applies. The Court’s first systematic effort to
reconcile hearsay exceptions with the Confrontation Clause’s
requirements yielded largely coextensive treatment of the hearsay
prohibition and constitutionally mandated exclusion. Beginning with
5
Ohio v. Roberts in 1980, the Court spent a quarter century refining
the idea that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the right to
confront witnesses applies only where the prior statement does not
6
bear sufficient indicia of reliability. Under Roberts and its progeny,
two signals of reliability emerged: a statement’s fit within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception and its “particularized guarantees of
7
trustworthiness.” As the Court proceeded to hold most hearsay
exceptions “firmly rooted,” the Confrontation Clause added little
8
force to the hearsay prohibition. Where the Court did examine the
trustworthiness of a statement more broadly, it focused on the context
in which the statement was produced and considered factors such as
9
the level of spontaneity and the speaker’s likely motivations.
In a series of cases beginning with Crawford v. Washington in 2004,
the Supreme Court “reconstitutionalized” the right to confrontation.
Writing for the Court in Crawford, Justice Scalia declared reliability
“an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept” and rejected it as a
10
touchstone for application of the right to confrontation. He later
5. Id.
6. Id. at 66; see also United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S.
805 (1990); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
7. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
8. Only the residual, “catch-all” hearsay exception and an accomplice’s custodial
confessions were excluded from the category of “firmly rooted” exceptions. See Lilly, 527 U.S.
at 134; Wright, 497 U.S. at 817.
9. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 806.
10. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61, 67–68 (2004) (emphasizing that
confrontation is a procedural right animated by concerns apart from the accuracy of the trial’s
outcome). The most persistent champion of the Confrontation Clause’s disentanglement from
hearsay doctrine has been Richard Friedman. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation:
The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1027–29 (1998) (arguing that the
confrontation right does not arise from reliability concerns); Richard D. Friedman, The
Confrontation Right Across the Systemic Divide, in CRIME, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN A
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR MIRJAN
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amplified his objection that the Roberts regime allowed the Court to
“create the exceptions that it thinks consistent with the policies
underlying the confrontation guarantee, regardless of how that
11
guarantee was historically understood.” According to the textual and
historical reasoning in Crawford, the confrontation right arises from
the nature, rather than the quality, of the out-of-court statement. The
term “witness” in the Confrontation Clause, the Court concluded,
reaches any out-of-court declarant whose statement constitutes
12
“testimony.” All testimonial statements, then, are barred by the
Confrontation Clause unless the out-of-court declarant is present for
cross examination at the criminal trial, or unavailable and subject to a
13
prior opportunity for cross examination. Although the Crawford
Court did not define “testimonial,” it explained that the term at least
covered responses to police interrogations and other assertions that
amount to prior testimony, including statements at a preliminary
14
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a formal trial.
B. Circularity in the Meaning of Testimonial
The stated goal of the Crawford decision was to fashion a more
15
“categorical” guarantee of confrontation. But the failure to put any
hard edges on the meaning of “testimonial,” beyond identifying the
obvious substitutes for trial testimony, led almost immediately to its
dilution. The Court concluded, for example, that a laboratory analyst’s
affidavit certifying that a substance is cocaine engages the
confrontation guarantee because its sole purpose is to establish the
16
identity of the substance in court. Once courts tried to use the
Crawford “rule” in off-brand situations that do not have labels like
affidavits, however, the inquiry acquired an open texture.
17
Davis v. Washington, decided in 2006, first exposed the lack of
precision in the Crawford formula. In Davis, the Court confronted 911
calls and police questioning in the domestic violence context,
endeavoring to categorize statements that do not resemble trial

DAMAŠKA 266 (John Jackson, Máximo Langer & Peter Tillers eds., 2008) (applauding
Crawford because it “detached the meaning of the Clause from the hearsay rule”).
11. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 374 (2008).
12. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
13. Id. at 68.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 67–68.
16. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009).
17. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
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testimony but can inculpate defendants to the same extent. The
Court held that statements are testimonial when their “primary
purpose” is to “establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
19
later criminal prosecution.” Statements are nontestimonial when
made “under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
20
ongoing emergency.”
Divining the “purpose” of a statement—as the Michigan v.
21
Bryant decision illustrates—ends up looking a great deal like the
Roberts determination as to whether a statement was sufficiently
reliable to forgo confrontation. Bryant involved statements made by a
shooting victim as he lay bleeding on the pavement of a Detroit gas
22
station. Police were dispatched to the scene at 3:25 AM, and five
23
officers responded. When they arrived at the gas station, they asked
24
the victim “what happened.” The victim indicated that he had been
shot half an hour before, and officers summoned emergency medical
25
assistance. Meanwhile, police continued questioning him about the
26
details of the shooting until paramedics arrived a few minutes later.
When they asked the victim who shot him, he named “Rick” (Bryant)
as the gunman and gave officers the location of the incident, which
27
was six blocks away. The victim died shortly thereafter at a hospital,
28
and his statements were admitted at Bryant’s murder trial.
Justice Sotomayor, writing for the Bryant majority, concluded that
the statements were not a “substitute for trial testimony,” but rather a
response to an ongoing emergency involving a “victim found in a
public location, suffering from a fatal gunshot wound, and a
perpetrator whose location was unknown at the time the police
29
located the victim.” The Court asserted that it was applying an
objective approach, based on the totality of the circumstances, to
determine whether the victim’s statement was the functional
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 817–19.
Id. at 822.
Id.
131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
Id. at 1150.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1150, 1170.
Id. at 1150.
Id. at 1156.
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30

equivalent of testimony. Davis also purported to articulate an
objective test, yet the factors that Davis and Bryant offer the lower
courts as a guide to determining whether a statement is testimonial
import a high degree of subjectivity and leave judges with broad
discretion. Among the considerations—many of which could point to
opposite conclusions—are the nature and timing of the questions, the
lapse of time between the incident described and the statement, the
declarant’s use of the present or past tense, the location of the
encounter that produces the statement, the formality of the
interrogation, whether a violent crime is at issue, whether a gun or
other weapon is involved, and the physical and emotional condition of
31
the declarant.
Justice Scalia authored the Davis opinion, which instituted most of
these factors, but vigorously dissented from Bryant because of an
additional (and familiar) consideration that surfaced in that case:
whether the statement would be admissible pursuant to the “standard
32
rules of hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable.”
That factor reintroduces the connection between the reliability
principles in the hearsay rules and the scope of the Confrontation
Clause right. The majority noted that the reliability-based hearsay
exceptions “rest on the belief that certain statements are, by their
nature, made for a purpose other than use in a prosecution and
33
therefore should not be barred by hearsay prohibitions.” The Court
cited, for example, the logic underlying the excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule: that one does not formulate falsehoods
34
in a state of agitation. The Bryant opinion also conflated the theory
behind hearsay exceptions with the evolving definition of
“testimonial.” According to the Court’s reasoning, the rationale for
Davis’s primary-purpose test is that “the prospect of fabrication in
statements given for the primary purpose of resolving [an] emergency
is presumably significantly diminished, [and] the Confrontation
Clause does not require such statements to be subject to the crucible
35
of cross-examination.”

30. Id.
31. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830–32 (2006); Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158–59,
1162–66; see also id. at 1162 (the assessment of whether a statement is testimonial accounts for
“all relevant circumstances”).
32. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1174.
33. Id. at 1157 n.9 (citing hearsay exceptions).
34. Id. at 1162 n.12.
35. Id. at 1157 n.9.
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Justice Scalia’s critique of the Bryant Court’s “unprincipled”
analysis has some force, but the Bryant decision brings several
36
passages from Crawford itself to mind. In Crawford, Justice Scalia
argued that the divergent lower court opinions on the applicability of
the Confrontation Clause provided a “self-contained demonstration”
37
of the flaws in the Roberts framework. The Supreme Court’s own
range of opinions in Bryant similarly underscores the ill-defined
boundaries of testimonial statements and the mutability of the
Crawford standard. Bryant conveys the sense that, in most
circumstances, the factors the Court articulated could be applied in an
outcome-driven way. The majority and dissenting opinions express
disagreement in part about extending the Davis standard, but more
38
broadly about the interpretation of the facts. Looking at the same
raw data, the Justices simply differed about how best to characterize
the purpose of either the police questioning or the victim’s statement.
The multi-factor balancing test that emerges from Davis turns out to
be every bit as discretionary as the Roberts scheme, and the salience
of the victim’s statement combined with the seriousness of the murder
39
prosecution appear to have weighed on the majority.
On the surface, Bryant may do little to change the Crawford
framework, but it does highlight the shortcomings of Crawford and its
extensions. It seems that the more effort the Court makes to clarify
the meaning of “testimonial,” the cloudier the picture becomes. There
may be inconsistent interpretations of a declarant’s intent, just as
conclusions differed as to a statement’s reliability. The aim of any
statement is difficult to isolate and discern, whether the trial courts
focus on the primary purpose of the declarant, of the statement, or of
the interrogation as a whole. Indeed, the entire “emergency response”
doctrine can be explained “as much as an exception to the
inadmissibility of testimonial statements as a limit on the scope of the
40
category.” It is simply not the case that in every emergency, “the
speaker and hearer [will] be more concerned about resolving the
emergency than with gathering statements for use in prosecution,” or
that they would have said the same thing “even if there were no

36. Id. at 1175 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004).
37. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 66.
38. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1170–72 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39. See id. at 1170 (“If the defendant ‘deserves’ to go to jail, then a court can focus on
whatever perspective is necessary to declare damning hearsay nontestimonial.”).
40. Michael S. Pardo, Testimony, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1, 57 (2007).
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41

prosecution forthcoming.” Similarly, a witness may make statements
to assist criminal prosecutions that describe past, present, or future
42
events. Instead of offering real guidance and imposing meaningful
limitations, those factors have become discretionary points of entry
for judges assessing how valuable lost evidence—particularly the
statements of now-silenced victims—would be.
Justice Scalia’s own reformulation of the Davis test in his Bryant
dissent focuses on the declarant’s intent alone, but otherwise provides
a definition of “testimonial” that is equally circular and just as likely
to produce inconsistent results. A testimonial statement, he writes, is
one made with “the understanding that [the statement] may be used
43
to invoke the coercive machinery of the State against the accused.”
According to Justice Scalia’s reasoning, a purposive test differs from a
reliability-based test because weaker substitutes for live testimony
44
may or may not be reliable. True, but Justice Scalia has also
repeatedly said that weaker substitutes for live testimony are the
appropriate focus of the Confrontation Clause precisely because it is
those statements that require reliability testing.
A second Confrontation Clause decision from the October 2010
45
Term, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, sounded a similar note about the
aim of the testimonial category. In Bullcoming, the Court held that
the prosecution may not introduce forensic laboratory reports
through the in-court testimony of analysts who did not certify the
46
results or personally observe the tests. Bullcoming was in many ways
an unsurprising application of the Court’s holding in Melendez-Diaz v.
47
Massachusetts —that certificates of analysis from a state forensic
laboratory are “affirmation[s] made for the purpose of establishing or
48
proving some fact” and therefore testimonial. Bullcoming offers
further evidence, however, of both the core dispute about the
significance of reliability, and the futility of resolving it through the
definition of “testimonial.” Although Justice Ginsburg’s opinion
asserts that reliability tells us nothing about whether a statement is
41. Id.
42. Id. at 56 (giving the example that “[a] speaker who tells the police his neighbor just
finished selling drugs, is currently selling drugs, or will be selling drugs in one hour is offering a
testimonial statement in all three instances”).
43. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1169 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 1175.
45. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
46. Id. at 2713.
47. 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
48. Id. at 2532.

GRIFFIN 11.30.11 V.2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

THE CONTENT OF CONFRONTATION

11/30/2011 12:32 PM

59

testimonial, it does acknowledge that testimonial statements are those
49
that require scrutiny of their reliability. Justice Sotomayor’s
concurrence responds to characterizations of the Bryant opinion and
50
explains that reliability remains “relevant” but is not “essential.” In
Justice Kennedy’s dissent, he objects to the Court’s rejection of
“reliability [as] a legitimate concern” and insists that statements could
“provide sufficient indicia of reliability and other safeguards to
51
comply with the Confrontation Clause as it should be understood.”
Although these formulations illustrate continuing disagreement
about the role of reliability in determining when the Confrontation
Clause applies, they uniformly cite the testing of evidence for
accuracy as the reason why it should. There is no dispute that the
Clause applies in order to ensure a certain level of epistemic
competence at trial. Having demonstrated that a test focused on the
purpose of the declarant can produce results as inconsistent as a
reliability inquiry, the Court should perhaps begin to account for the
purpose of confrontation instead. Future applications of Crawford
could work backwards from the utility of confrontation and apply a
content-driven standard to clarify the category of out-of-court
statements that merit testimonial treatment.
III. “TO CONFRONT”
If the Court is to find common ground, or even maintain a stable
majority for any approach to the post-Crawford Confrontation
Clause, it may need to use a different lens to evaluate whether
52
hearsay implicates the “Sixth Amendment’s core concerns.” Efforts
to define which hearsay declarants are “witnesses against” the
defendant have not produced consistent results, and looking instead
to what it means “to confront” a hearsay declarant could prove more
fruitful. The Court agrees, after all, that testimonial statements are
those that should be tested through a particular kind of reliability
guarantee. Confrontation, Justice Scalia wrote in Crawford, is “the
only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional
53
demands.” Justice Scalia made a similar statement in his dissenting

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715.
Id. at 2720 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2725, 2727 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
Id. at 69.
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54

opinion in Maryland v. Craig, where he asserted that the
Confrontation Clause “guarantees specific trial procedures that were
55
thought to assure reliable evidence.” The Court has repeatedly
stated that those procedures refer to cross examination of accusing
56
witnesses. As the Bryant Court affirmed, the “basic objective” of the
Confrontation Clause is to safeguard the “opportunity to cross57
examine the declarant about statements taken for use at trial.”
A. An Intertwined Substantive and Procedural Guarantee
This piece suggests that one way out of the interpretive difficulties
with the testimonial concept might be to ask when cross examination
serves the purposes of confrontation. As David Sklansky argues,
inconsistencies in the Court’s jurisprudence on the Confrontation
Clause arise in part from the failure to consider its underlying goals
and identify those cases in which applying the right can make a
58
“functional difference.” In other words, in order to identify which
out-of-court statements are improper substitutes for live testimony,
the Court might give fuller consideration to the potential that cross
examination has to test those statements in court. That idea, only
briefly explored here, requires further work on implementation. It
also risks running afoul of Justice Scalia’s rigorous distinction
59
between procedural and substantive guarantees of reliability. There
is a close relationship, however, between the procedural means and
60
the substantive, epistemic ends. Confrontation protects against
54. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
55. See id. at 862.
56. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (the appearance of a declarant who
testifies at trial about the prior hearsay statement vindicates the right to confrontation, as does a
prior opportunity to cross examine an unavailable declarant); see also Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 241–42 (1895); David Alan
Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1644–45 (2009) (stating that the
meaning of confrontation—“cross-examination of prosecution witnesses by defense counsel in
front of the jury”—has been settled for decades).
57. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011).
58. See Sklansky, supra note 56, at 1655–56; see also David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last
Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 49 (discussing the approach often termed “liberal originalism,”
which considers the harms a constitutional provision seeks to prevent and asks “how we can
best be faithful to those purposes today”); cf. Jeffrey L. Fisher, What Happened—and What Is
Happening—To the Confrontation Clause?, 15 J. L. & POL’Y 587, 626 (2007) (“[T]he
confrontation right needs to be protected with doctrine that reflects confrontation values.”).
59. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (explaining that the Confrontation
Clause “commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular
manner”).
60. By way of contrast, the Fifth Amendment protection against compelled testimonial
self-incrimination is a hybrid. Coercive interrogation techniques can produce false confessions,
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abuses of government power, but its specific concern is those abuses
that produce inaccuracies. The “principal evil” at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed, according to the Court in
Crawford, “was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and
particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the
62
accused.” The Justices may differ on the weight of potential
government manipulation of evidence versus more general reliability
63
issues, but they share a “concern for the accuracy of the truth64
determining process in criminal trials.” The “abhorrence” of ex parte
affidavits, for example, arises from apprehension about their
65
trustworthiness. “The danger is that innocent defendants may be
convicted on the basis of unreliable, untested statements by those who
observed—or claimed to have observed—preparation for or
66
commission of the crime.”
Given the objectives of the Confrontation Clause, courts should
apply it in those cases where cross examination has the potential to
reveal a declarant’s calculation or error. Much of that potential can be
assessed ex ante through the substance, rather than the circumstances,
of the out-of-court statement. One problem with the test that has
divided the Court is that “primary purpose”—“why” a declarant
made a statement (or the purpose an investigator had in questioning
67
her)—is not easily identified. But the content of a statement—what
but they also violate extra-epistemic values. The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures is purely procedural. An illegal search may yield highly
reliable evidence, such as a stash house full of narcotics, but privacy and liberty concerns
nonetheless require its exclusion from trial.
61. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7 (“Involvement of government officers in the production
of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse—a fact
borne out time and again throughout a history with which the Framers were keenly familiar.”).
Of course, the Court’s claims about the historical origins of the Confrontation Clause are
themselves contested. See id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“The Court’s
distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements, contrary to its claim, is no better
rooted in history than our current doctrine.”); see also generally Thomas Y. Davies, What Did
the Framers Know and When Did They Know It?: Fictional Originalism in Crawford v.
Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005).
62. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
63. That distinction is apparent in the debate about whether the declarant’s or the
questioner’s intent controls in the “primary purpose” test. See Transcript of Oral Argument at
24, Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (No. 09-150).
64. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
65. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 48–50 (written evidence taken ex parte “very seldom leads to
the proper discovery of the truth”).
66. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2726 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
67. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 839 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[P]rimacy
requires constructing a hierarchy of purpose that will rarely be present—and is not reliably
discernible.”).
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it conveys—lies closer to the surface. That content, including the
extent to which it makes or amplifies an accusation, and whether it
concerns the fault or identity of a perpetrator, could help determine
whether a declarant is bearing witness within the meaning of the
Confrontation Clause.
B. Cross Examination in Theory and Practice
Any assessment of whether a statement lends itself to useful
dissection through cross examination requires some reflection on how
cross examination supposedly establishes reliability. In theory, cross
examination accomplishes three things: perjury prevention, error
identification, and some vindication of dignity interests. Perhaps the
most consistent justification for its centrality in confrontation
68
jurisprudence is that it prevents perjury. Cross examination has been
widely touted as the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the
69
discovery of truth.” It is also theorized as a method for exposing
70
errors. False testimony, of course, does not always arise from outright
dishonesty or even susceptibility to manipulation. The hearsay
dangers include inaccurate perception, memory, or description of
71
what occurred, and adversarial questioning can detect those errors.
Cross examination works as counter narrative as well; it “dramatizes
for the jury not only that there are two stories to tell about most
events, but also that there is always a discontinuity between any event
72
and even the best telling of it.”
68. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2009) (stating that a
forensic analyst “who provides false results may, under oath in open court, reconsider his false
testimony”).
69. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367, at 32
(James H. Chadbourne ed., 1974); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Worst Evidence
Principle: The Best Hypothesis as to the Logical Structure of Evidence Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1069, 1072 (1992) (discussing the primary concerns of evidence law and identifying the
prevention of witness perjury as the core).
70. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2537 (“Confrontation is designed to weed out
not only the fraudulent analyst but the incompetent one as well.”).
71. See Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay
Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177, 188 (1948) (“[C]ross examination can and does reveal . . .
peculiarities in the use of language . . . [and] expose[s] faults in perception and memory.”); see
also Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1341 (1987)
(accuracy is maximized if the jury has “more information about the specific circumstances
affecting [the declarant’s] perception and memory of the events”); cf. ROBERT P. BURNS, THE
DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 19 (2009) (“The assumption underlying cross-examination is
that the witness has chosen to cut into the great booming, buzzing confusion of life in a way that
is consciously or unconsciously willful, that he or she has left out something important that
changes the meaning of everything.”).
72. BURNS, supra note 71, at 17.
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These theories have force, but the effect of cross examination in
73
practice is largely an “article of faith”; it has rarely received critical
74
evaluation, and there is little empirical evidence on its efficacy. Cross
examination is basically a “blunt instrument,” and only a “hit-or-miss
safeguard against the truth-bending and truth-concealing effects of
placing partisans in charge of the production and presentation of the
75
evidence.” Even John Henry Wigmore—who gave cross examination
that notorious endorsement as the “greatest engine” for discovering
truth—acknowledged that it can be manipulated to create false
76
impressions with partial truths. The extant psychological studies,
moreover, suggest that cross examination has only limited utility as a
77
tool for identifying error and falsehood. Criminal procedure
doctrine generally has incorporated empirical data and the insights of
78
social science at a glacial pace. But the comparatively new and stillevolving right recognized in Crawford could be informed by current
research on the function of cross examination, which suggests that
73. See Richard O. Lempert, Built on Lies: Preliminary Reflections on Evidence Law as an
Autopoietic System, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 345 (1998) (“[T]he likely effectiveness of crossexamination in getting at the truth is seldom examined—numerous court opinions and
commentaries rely on Wigmore’s conclusion . . . rather than on empirical evidence.”).
74. See, e.g., Roger C. Park, Adversarial Influences on the Interrogation of Trial Witnesses,
in ADVERSARIAL VERSUS INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE 131 (Peter J. Van Koppen & Steven D.
Penrod eds., 2003).
75. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF THE ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 270 (2003).
76. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 3 (2d ed. 1913)
(cross examination, although “the most efficacious expedient ever invented for the extraction of
truth,” may be “almost equally powerful for the creation of false impressions”); WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS, supra note 69, § 1367, at 32 (adversaries can “make the truth appear like
falsehood” and “do anything [they want] with cross examination”).
77. H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through
the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 787–88 (1993) (stating that repeated experiments have
documented that observing nonverbal behavior does little to reveal lying and that “we can
hardly afford to ignore the cumulative conclusion, painful as it may be to some cherished
assumptions of the process”).
78. See Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion,
2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 155 (noting the “ever-widening gap between Fourth Amendment
consent jurisprudence, on the one hand, and scientific findings about the psychology of
compliance and consent on the other”); cf. John E.B. Myers, et al., Hearsay Exceptions:
Adjusting the Ratio of Intuition to Psychological Science, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 3, 8
(2002) (the idea that “trauma momentarily stills the capacity or motivation to lie” is
“unsupported by empirical evidence”). For one context in which social science and legal
standards are beginning to align, consider the increasing use of hearings to determine the
reliability of eyewitness identifications and instructions to jurors on the influences that heighten
the risk of misidentification. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, In New Jersey, Rules Are Changed on
Witness IDs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2011, at A1. Courts have cited recent social science on
mistaken identifications and empirical research documenting that eyewitness misidentifications
are the leading cause of wrongful convictions. See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT:
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 45–83 (2011).
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cross examination does less work than the Court assumes. In some
cases, the opportunity to test the substance of a prior statement and
compare it with in-court testimony could broadly impact reliability. In
others, the observation of a live witness may serve only as a
distraction.
Consistency between statements can indicate truthfulness, but it
turns out that demeanor and confidence provide few cues to
79
deception. One researcher, for example, consulted judges on the
standards by which jurors are asked to assess credence and found that
“internal inconsistency and external contradictions” rated at the top
80
of the scale. Other experiments indicate that mock jurors can
distinguish between direct testimony from eye witnesses and hearsay
declarations, even without the opportunity to observe that distinction,
81
and can weigh the evidence appropriately. Moreover, recent
empirical work challenges the idea that there are “universal behaviors
that reveal deceit”; if liars exhibit demeanor cues, “they do so in many
82
diverse and barely perceptible ways.” Nonverbal signals may actually
mislead. The level of confidence and certainty that eye witnesses
display, for example, enhances jurors’ assessments of their credibility,
83
but does not correlate with the accuracy of their identifications.
Simply put, experimental data suggests that “ordinary observers do
not benefit from the opportunity to observe nonverbal behavior in
84
judging whether someone is lying.”
79. See Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of Cognitive Error,
57 STAN. L. REV. 291, 335 (2004); see also Chris William Sanchirico, “What Makes the Engine
Go?” Cognitive Limitations and Cross-Examination, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 507, 514–15 (2009)
(“Cognitive limitations imply that the task of presenting consistent, detailed, and robust
testimony draws a much heavier cognitive load for the fabricating witness than for the witness
who honestly recounts her actual memories.”); Aldert Vrij, et al., Outsmarting the Liars: The
Benefit of Asking Unanticipated Questions, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 164 (2009)
(“[C]ompared to truth tellers, liars gave relatively inconsistent answers to the unanticipated
questions.”).
80. See Uviller, supra note 77, at 825.
81. See, e.g., Peter Miene, Roger C. Park & Eugene Borgida, Juror Decision Making and
the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 683, 691–92 (1992).
82. Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. L. REV. 143, 176–
77 (2011).
83. Id. at 157–58 (summarizing the experimental research on witness confidence); see also
Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 80–81 (2008).
84. Olin Guy Wellborn, III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1088 (1991); id. at 1091
(“Transcripts are probably superior to live testimony as a basis for credibility judgments
because they eliminate distracting, misleading, and unreliable nonverbal data and enhance the
most reliable data, verbal content.”); see also Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo,
Individual Differences in Judging Deception: Accuracy and Bias, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL. 477, 483
(2007) (detection of testimonial accuracy in experimental subjects was not appreciably higher
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Recognizing the substantive limitations of pure presence in the
courtroom might encounter some resistance, in part because there is a
third dimension to cross examination: the relationship between live
85
testimony and intrinsic interests in both solemnity and fair play.
Confrontation primarily addresses accuracy concerns, but it also
serves to “accord[] the defendant a degree of dignity, allowing him
some agency in the adjudication process and treating his input and his
86
objections as worthy of respect.” There is also a popular culture of
cross examination—in legal thrillers and media accounts of highprofile trials—that treats it as the central plot point in the courtroom
drama. The folklore of the adversarial trial privileges resolution
through conflict, and cross examination fulfills expectations for some
87
verbal skirmishes. Various cases cite this performative aspect of live
88
89
confrontation. In United States v. Yates, for example, the Eleventh
Circuit found live, two-way video conferencing with overseas
witnesses insufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause because it
90
lacked the “intangible elements of the ordeal of testifying.” Physical
presence can serve important expressive functions, but as discussed
here, the essential purposes of confrontation are analytic ones, and the
substantive interaction between prior statements and current
testimony produces information that speaks more directly to those
concerns.
IV. EPISTEMIC COMPETENCE
AND REMAINING QUESTIONS ABOUT CRAWFORD
While the scope of confrontation extends beyond the hearsay
rules, it also makes sense to design its reach in keeping with epistemic
than what would occur by chance); Saul M. Kassin, Human Judges of Truth, Deception, and
Credibility: Confident but Erroneous, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 809, 809–10 (2002) (same).
85. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 90 (1997) (citing the fairness rationales for confrontation); cf. Raymond LaMagna,
Note, (Re)Constitutionalizing Confrontation: Reexamining the Unavailability and the Value of
Live Testimony, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1499, 1502–05 (2006) (arguing that the right cannot be
vindicated by prior opportunities for cross examination and requires live testimony).
86. Sklansky, supra note 58, at 52.
87. Cf. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 61–65 (1980)
(observing that, in the legal context, “[r]ational argument is . . . comprehended and carried out
in terms of war”).
88. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017–19, 1021 (1988) (characterizing the right to faceto-face confrontation as the “irreducible literal meaning of the [Confrontation] Clause” and
finding a violation of that right when child witnesses who had been victims of sexual assault
testified from behind a screen).
89. 438 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
90. Id. at 1313 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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values. The ideal of confrontation is to subject evidence “to a scrutiny
or analysis calculated to discover and expose in detail its possible
weaknesses, and thus to enable the tribunal to estimate it at no more
91
than its actual value.” Evaluating statements according to the
potential for assessing evidentiary worth in court would be at least as
consistent as the “primary purpose” test. That test “has made it
significantly more difficult to convict the guilty, without improving the
92
chances of vindicating the innocent.” Before deciding whether
confrontation must occur, the Court might consider whether it can
accomplish anything, and what shape it could take.
To be sure, any such inquiry recalls the reliability framework, and
the Crawford majority has resisted an express turn back to reliability.
There is a difference, however, between asking whether a statement’s
reliability has been established through means other than
confrontation—as in the Roberts-like analysis that Justice Scalia
93
expressly rejected in Crawford —and asking whether cross
examination itself will contribute to reliability. Take, for example, an
illustration that the Bryant case provides. The statement in question
was the victim’s identification of his assailant. Focusing on the content
of the statement, rather than the question whether it “shares key
characteristics with trial testimony,” the statement is testimonial in the
94
sense that it transmits “information for use in prosecution.” The
victim, Anthony Covington, had been buying cocaine from Bryant for
95
more than three years and had recently used cocaine when he died.
Although he named the perpetrator, it is unlikely that Covington
actually saw him because the bullet passed through the closed
96
backdoor of Bryant’s house. Furthermore, Covington identified the
shooter by his voice, but gave law enforcement a physical description

91. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS, supra note 69, at § 1360 at 1; see also Kentucky v.
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 737 (1987) (cross examination is a “‘functional’ right designed to promote
reliability in the truth-finding functions of a criminal trial”).
92. Donald A. Dripps, Controlling the Damage Done by Crawford v. Washington: Three
Consecutive Proposals, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 535 (2010); see also Tom Lininger,
Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 749–50 (2005) (stating that after
Crawford, hundreds of domestic violence cases were dismissed or lost at trial because of
evidentiary problems with prior statements by recanting witnesses).
93. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (“Dispensing with confrontation
because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with a jury trial because the
defendant is obviously guilty.”).
94. See Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of Testimonial, 71 BROOK. L.
REV. 241, 248, 251 (2005).
95. People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Mich. 2009), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
96. Id.
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97

that did not match Bryant’s. Whether he could have testified
coherently and consistently under cross examination would provide
98
some answers to obvious questions about accuracy.
A content-driven evaluation of statements like these does not turn
on fit with the hearsay exceptions, and it also has the potential to
achieve confrontation’s broader goals. Although the Court has at
times disavowed any interest in whether cross examination “would
99
actually serve a useful purpose,” some decisions do contemplate the
100
likely effectiveness of cross examination. That focus, moreover,
accords with Justice Scalia’s reasoning that Covington’s statement
warranted confrontation because the exchange with police officers
conveyed the same information that would have emerged from a
101
“routine direct examination” at trial. If the primary concern of the
Confrontation Clause is to prevent potential government
102
manipulation, then the susceptibility of a statement to cross
examination—in terms of its centrality to the prosecution’s case and
the likelihood that questioning will reveal the involvement of
government officers in its production—ought to be another relevant
factor.
Increased accounting for the capacity of cross examination also
sheds light on questions about its adequacy. Appearance in the
courtroom now amounts to both the minimal requirement for cross
examination and a sufficiency standard. For twenty years, the Court’s
103
decision in United States v. Owens has defined what constitutes an
opportunity to cross examine a hearsay declarant who testifies at trial.
97. Id.
98. See Sanchirico, Cognitive Limitations, supra note 79, at 512–13 (concluding that the law
exploits cognitive limitations of bad actors in ways that have significantly less impact on sincere
actors); id. at 517 (“Unlike the fabricating witness, the sincere witness is aided in providing
consistent testimony by the fact that what she is relating did actually happen, and is therefore in
accord with the laws of physics and chemistry.”).
99. Sklansky, supra note 58, at 53; see also United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 560
(1988) (“[S]uccessful cross-examination is not the constitutional guarantee.”).
100. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 63 n.1 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
101. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1171 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. See, e.g., Lisa Kern Griffin, Circling Around the Confrontation Clause: Redefined
Reach But Not a Robust Right, 105 MICH. L. REV., FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16, 19, 21 (2006) (noting
that Crawford and subsequent decisions presume that the goal of confrontation is to expose
governmental coercion or manipulation in the production of testimony). But see Randolph N.
Jonakait, The Right to Confrontation: Not a Mere Restraint on Government, 76 MINN. L. REV.
615, 616 (1992) (preventing government abuse only partially animates the Confrontation
Clause; it “operates not as a direct restraint on abusive governmental practices, but as a grant of
positive rights to those charged with a crime”).
103. 484 U.S. 554 (1988).
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In that case, the witness—a correctional officer who had been the
victim of an assault that caused traumatic head injuries—had no
memory of the underlying event but professed recollection of his
104
prior identification of the assailant while he was in the hospital. The
Court concluded that as long as a declarant has some memory of the
circumstances surrounding the statement, that will suffice for
105
purposes of confrontation. Courts have relied on Owens to drop the
standard still lower, deciding that witnesses with no memory of prior
conversations can be cross examined effectively because the jury can
106
observe demeanor. Asserting a privilege, or otherwise refusing to
testify altogether, does not afford an opportunity for cross
107
examination, but willing submission to questioning, even if the
108
proffered answers are entirely nonresponsive, is enough.
The foregoing discussion suggests, however, that the opportunity
to cross examine must include questioning about the subject matter of
the prior statement and not simply the making of the statement
109
itself. Even if a jury observes the demeanor and capacity of a
witness at trial, it may not accurately evaluate the reliability of the
prior statement in question. Although the person in the witness chair
and the out-of-court declarant are one and the same, intervening
events and information may have effected changes in the witness. She
is different, in potentially meaningful ways, from the witness who
104. Id. at 556.
105. See id. at 559 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]hat opportunity is not denied when a
witness testifies as to his current belief but is unable to recollect the reason for that belief.”).
106. See, e.g., State v. Holliday, 745 N.W.2d 556, 566 (Minn. 2008) (witness had memory loss
attributed to drug use, but was nonetheless sufficiently present for cross examination); State v.
Price, 146 P.3d 1183, 1192 (Wash. 2006) (child victim could not remember the incident or prior
statements, but was held to be subject to cross examination because present in court).
107. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970) (to vindicate the right to cross
examination, the inquiry must be sufficient to “afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for
evaluating the truth of [a] prior statement”); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419–20 (1965)
(defiantly silent witness cannot be confronted); United States v. Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d 1128,
1132–33 (10th Cir. 1999) (“legal availability” of a hearsay declarant is insufficient); United
States v. Spotted War Bonnet, 933 F.2d 1471, 1474 (8th Cir. 1991) (mere presence of a child
witness does not satisfy the Confrontation Clause); United States v. DiCaro, 772 F.2d 1314,
1322–25, 1324 n.6 (7th Cir. 1985) (a “total memory lapse” with respect to both the prior
statement and its contents would preclude cross examination); Barksdale v. State, 453 S.E.2d 2,
4 (Ga. 1995) (a witness who appeared in the courtroom but flatly refused to testify was not
subject to cross examination).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Keeter, 130 F.3d 297, 302 (7th Cir. 1997) (even feigned
amnesia is not an impediment to adequate cross examination).
109. See, e.g., State v. Canady, 911 P.2d 104, 115–16, 116 n.14 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996) (a
witness “should be subject to cross examination about the subject matter of the prior statement”
and should “be capable of testifying substantively about the event” to ensure that the statement
is trustworthy).
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made the earlier statement. And only when she recalls both the
underlying past events, and the circumstances of speaking about them
before, can the jury assess the inconsistencies and inaccuracies that
might signal error and falsehood.
This conception of confrontation not only increases the likelihood
of vindicating the right, but also addresses some situations in which
confusion about the meaning of “testimonial” has had unintended
110
consequences for the integrity of the evidence. In certain cases, the
prior statement may be considered the superior evidence. Particularly
in the domestic violence context, the witness who appeared before the
grand jury is often preferable, in terms of credibility, to the one
refusing to testify in court. The witness, after all, is often just a prop
during cross examination, with the examining lawyer providing most
of the content. Indeed, various researchers have documented a truth111
hindering effect of vigorous cross examination, particularly with
112
regard to the testimony of vulnerable witnesses. Jurors may be
better positioned to appraise the out-of-court statement because
there is a higher accuracy rate for deception detection with respect to
113
unprepared statements and unrehearsed testimony. As for the jury’s
ability to assess potential manipulation by interrogators, subsequent
cross examination may also run a distant second place to verbatim
recordings of the original exchange between government agents and
114
potential witnesses. Further, an understanding of the limitations of
physical presence opens up the possibility that video uplinks, satellite
testimony, or closed-circuit questioning could supply meaningful
confrontation. In cases that feature traumatized witnesses, substitute
115
cross examination may offer the only possibility for confrontation.
110. See Sklansky, supra note 58, at 58–59 (“Even when a conviction can be secured without
use of the victim’s statements, but especially when it cannot, refusing to allow the jury to hear
the victim’s own words can erode the ‘moral credibility’ of the criminal justice system.”).
111. See, e.g., Tim Valentine & Katie Maras, The Effect of Cross-Examination on the
Accuracy of Adult Eyewitness Testimony, 25 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 554 (2011).
112. See, e.g., Rachel Zajac & Harlene Hayne, I Don’t Think That’s What Really Happened:
The Effect of Cross-Examination on the Accuracy of Children’s Reports, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. APPLIED 187, 193 (2003).
113. See Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgments, 10
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 214, 227 (2006) (summarizing findings that listeners
“achieve higher lie-truth detection accuracy when judging unplanned rather than planned
messages”).
114. Cf. Simon, supra note 82, at 182 (“Factfinders would gain much by being able to
compare witnesses’ courtroom testimony with the exact statements they initially gave the
police.”).
115. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990) (holding that two-way closed-circuit
video cross examination satisfied the right to confrontation because reliability was assured by
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In others, the hearsay in question—if it takes a form such as a
recorded deposition—affords a better opportunity to review for
accuracy, consistency, and the suggestiveness or manipulability of the
116
initial questioning.
Finally, the Court continues to face questions about sufficient
confrontation of expert forensic testimony. Many potential witnesses
have contact with the samples submitted for forensic testing, and the
Court has been assessing case-by-case which of those witnesses must
be available for cross examination. In June 2011, the Court granted
117
certiorari in Williams v. Illinois, which raises the issue of whether an
expert witness can rely on a nontestifying declarant’s hearsay
118
statements about the results of DNA testing. That hearsay can be
imported into an expert opinion pursuant to the rules of evidence, so
long as it is a statement on which experts ordinarily would rely, and
119
the court deems that reliance reasonable. Demonstrating reliability
within the meaning of the hearsay rules, however, does not fully
address the constitutional concern. A content-driven assessment as to
whether the absent analyst could reveal sources of bias and error
under cross examination might help determine when confronting a
120
surrogate expert is an adequate test of reliability.
V. CONCLUSION
This brief contribution suggests that uncoupling confrontation
from reliability has done little to clarify the scope of the confrontation
right because the two concepts are inextricably intertwined. A clearer
understanding of what cross examination means and does could help
sort those statements that serve as substitutes for in-court testimony,
the oath and the opportunity to observe the questioning, and the procedure avoided trauma to
the witness); see also, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) (confrontation “means
more than being allowed to confront the witness physically”).
116. The limited utility of cross examination may also point to a broader meaning of
confrontation, including access to evidence and expertise. See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 58, at 7
(“[T]he kind of ‘confrontation’ a criminal defendant needs and deserves may in many cases have
little to do with excluding hearsay evidence—or, for that matter, with sitting in court and
watching a witness testify, on direct and then on cross-examination.”).
117. People v. Williams, 939 N.E.2d 268, 278 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (U.S.
June 28, 2011) (No. 10-8505).
118. Id.
119. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
120. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause After
Crawford v. Washington, 15 J. L. & POL’Y 791, 854–55 (2007) (surrogate testimony by qualified
experts might be permissible where the original analyst is unavailable, the original testing was
well documented, and retesting is not feasible).
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and therefore merit in-court scrutiny. It might also lead to more
comprehensive standards for the opportunity to cross examine where
it is required, and recognition that some alternatives to in-court
testimony can vindicate the confrontation right.

